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1. Introduction
In order to understand the empirical relationship between ethnic divisions and violent
conflict, Esteban et al. (2012) pose two challenges: making a decision on the relevant
notion of divisions and, second, estimating the sensitivities of these divisions to the
underlying conflict. This paper takes up this claim in the context of the recent
Sri Lankan Civil War, a conflict that lasted nearly 30 years taking the lives of an
estimated 80,000-100,000 citizens (almost 0.5% of the total population). Through the
lens of the colonial legacy and its impact on ethnic divisions, we develop a measure
of the relevant ethnic divisions that is different from standard polarization indices.
We then allow for these divisions to be sensitive to the underlying conflict as the
conflict progresses and spreads throughout the island, creating a dynamic measure
of polarization. Using both measures, we find that ethnic divisions centered on
linguistic disenfranchisement have exacerbated the conflict.
The two challenges above pose considerable econometric difficulties, especially
for the usual venue of empirical analysis in this literature, the much maligned cross-
country study. It is well-known that cross-country studies fail to account for two
important sources of heterogeneity. First, there is heterogeneity among countries
with respect to the choice of an appropriate notion of ethnic division. The standard
practice of using a country-neutral measure will tend to attenuate the effect since a
uniformly applied selection of ethnic divisions will often result in measurement errors
uncorrelated with the unobserved, idiosyncratic determinants of conflict. However,
turning to country-specific measures will invite concerns about comparability and
data-mining. Second, there may be time-invariant unobservables that explain the
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level of conflict. Standard panel data methods to deal with this heterogeneity are
rarely appropriate since most polarization indices usually do not change much over
time. One remedy is to allow the time-invariant measure to have different causal
impacts over time. However, this approach is undesirable for both theoretical, in the
sense of the two preconditions above, and econometric reasons, since the total effect
may turn out to be poorly estimated and, ultimately this approach may not indicate
which effect is the relevant one from a policy point of view.
How does the within-country analysis of the conflict in Sri Lanka that we study
deal with these issues? We tailor our measure to the Sri Lankan context by emphasiz-
ing the link between colonial heritage and the ethnolinguistic conflict. The backlash
against colonial policies is often a source of post-independence conflict. Sri Lanka is
a polarized society with a few ethnic groups, the largest of which are the majority
Sinhalese and the minority Tamils. The conflict is a special case because there is
a clear linguistic component over which the majority and minority could disagree.
The linguistic origins of the conflict stem from the Sinhala-only movement and the
subsequent governmental attempts and failures to impose monolingual policies and
other types of policies that favored the majority and led to disenfranchisement along
ethnolinguistic lines. First, there was a direct effect, which changed the relative
costs and benefits of linguistic endowments and language acquisition. This type of
disenfranchisement increased the cost of access to public employment such as civil
service jobs and public resources such as higher education. Second, linguistic disen-
franchisement created uncertainties concerning the stability of clientelistic networks
which had been formed along ethnic lines, and altered access to public resources.
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These two types of disenfranchisement, which both focus on changes in entitlements
as opposed to levels, are the motivation for our measure of ethnic divisions, and
correspond to the findings in Miguel et al. (2004) that it is changes in income and
not levels that predict civil conflict.
Our empirical measure of ethnic divisions is unique in that it specifically accounts
for the scope of disenfranchisement, albeit in the framework of well-studied polariza-
tion measures. Even though the concepts of polarization and disenfranchisement are
not identical, one can argue that in the case of two linguistic groups, there is a posi-
tive correlation between the two, that is, an increase of the degree of polarization in
a two-group society raises the level of disenfranchisement generated by one-language
policies.1 We focus on polarization empirically, because it is difficult to observe the
extent of disenfranchisement independently from polarization and conflict. Specifi-
cally, we use outcomes generated by linguistic policies conducted in colonial Ceylon
as distances in the degree of alienation between groups.
By historical accident, the colonial linguistic policies enhanced the scope for disen-
franchisement along ethnolinguistic lines by inducing spatial variation in the number
of English speakers on the island. We argue that the change in English proficiency
during the colonial period affected the extent of ethnic divisions that were exogenous
to the ensuing civil conflict. Since these divisions could have been aggravated dur-
ing the nearly 30-year period of the civil war, their sensitivity could have changed
over time. To account for this possibility, we construct a dynamic polarization index
based on the arguments that past conflict primes and intensifies divisions. This index
1For a discussion of relevant concepts see Ginsburgh and Weber (2011).
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has an attractive feature: the more intense is the experienced violence during the
conflict, the more polarization increases.
Since data on violent conflict in a developing country are difficult to obtain, we
collected data on the total number of victims of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) attacks per district by year. This measure accurately tracks only one of the
major sources of violent conflict during the war and one needs to be careful in inter-
preting it. It does not capture pogroms, which were serious in certain districts, nor
does it capture conflicts primarily associated with other groups. Using district-level
socioeconomic factors such as literacy in English, urban share of the population and
population growth as controls, we test the hypothesis that polarization caused the
intensity of conflict. We show that both our measures of polarization, the static and
the dynamic, which account for the cross-sectional differences in disenfranchisement
explain conflict. Taken together, the empirical results suggest the importance of the
measurement of divisions in indices of polarization. In this specific case, the aggrava-
tion of linguistic-based divisions caused by the colonial legacy improves the precision
of the estimates of the effect of polarization on conflict.
We also perform several robustness checks. In particular, we rerun the results
on a subsample of districts which report at least one victim from LTTE attacks,
dropping the districts which experienced the worst pogroms.
The organization of the paper is as follows. First, we discuss the previous liter-
ature. Second, we discuss the civil war and provide the necessary historical details.
Next, we describe the data and present the results. Finally, we conclude.
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2. Previous Literature
Understanding civil conflict is often couched in terms of greed (to what extent do
the relevant parties gain materially from the conflict) and grievances (to what extent
have the relevant parties suffered in the past). Collier and Hoeﬄer (2004) argue that
while there are many ethnic groups in conflict, as documented by Horowitz (1985),
few escalate into civil war and the difference in outcomes can be traced to the ability
of opportunistic political actors to capture resources. Reynal-Querol and Djankov
(2010) find indirect support for this thesis in that the lack of respect for the rule of
law predicts the onset of civil war. We hold these factors fixed in our analysis by
focusing on a single country. Moreover, we do not study the onset of civil war, rather
our focus is on the intensity of the conflict.
The empirical literature of ethnolinguistic diversity and economic outcomes is
well-established. See among others Alesina et al. (1999); Easterly and Levine (1997);
Alesina et al. (2003); Ginsburgh and Weber (2011). Much emphasis has been placed
on how ethnic divisions can deteriorate public goods provision (Alesina et al., 1999;
Desmet et al., 2005; Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). While there appears to be
consensus surrounding public goods provision, there is still a debate on the role of
ethnic divisions and violent conflict.2
2In an important sense, social order and its maintenance is a public good so the lack of empirical
consensus is puzzling. However, there are theoretical and empirical reasons for why less consensus
has been achieved. The maintenance of order is a very different type of public good than schooling
or public health and therefore merits special attention. First, the maintenance of social order
encompasses the provision of most public goods and, in fact, is necessary for many of them. Second,
the relationship between conflict and the maintenance of social order on some level and at some
point is discrete by nature. Third, the maintenance of social order has a long memory and, while
there is persistence in the provision of public goods, the quality of public goods is not as sensitive
to history as social order. And, fourth, the externalities can be global, similar to public health, but
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Fearon and Laitin (2003) are critical of the literature that claims to have dis-
covered a positive relationship between ethnic divisions and violent conflict based
on cross-country regressions, and demonstrate under reasonable specifications that
fractionalization is not related to conflict. If fractionalization reflects linguistic dif-
ferences alone, Laitin (2000) even argues that linguistic diversity is an instrument
for peace. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) respond by arguing that fractional-
ization is not the right measure of ethnic divisions, and show that when divisions are
represented by polarization measures, they have a positive impact on conflict. The
findings in Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) are supported by the theoretically-
motivated approaches in Esteban and Ray (1994) and Esteban et al. (2012). Alesina
and La Ferrara (2005) show that the effect of fractionalization is strongest in poor
countries. Esteban et al. (2012) show that both fractionalization and polarization can
be positively related to violent conflict. Which measure is appropriate depends upon
what is at stake in the conflict, in particular how public is the nature of the resources
affected by the dispute. The authors then construct a measure of the “publicness”
of the resources at stake and find support for their thesis.
Given these insights, the literature has moved towards using less aggregated data,
giving much better control over omitted institutional factors and country-level vari-
ables such as the publicness variable. Mitra and Ray (2012) investigate the relation-
ship between economic outcomes, religious divisions and violent conflict in India.
Field et al. (2008) are able to disaggregate even further by exploring neighborhood
of a different nature. In addition to these differences, the empirical exercise necessary to test the
relationship between ethnic divisions and conflict is more difficult than for the case of public goods
because of data quality and availability.
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level variation in religious diversity and conflict in the city of Ahmedabad, India.
Novta (2013) studies district-level differences in conflict in the Bosnian civil war.
Do and Iyer (2010) explore how geography and poverty explain the intensity and
incidence of civil war in Nepal. They find no statistical relationship between conflict
and ethnic divisions.
Often, the specific historical experiences have not been accounted for in the mea-
sure of group divisions. There is a growing literature on how historical experiences
can influence current outcomes in profound ways. In the case of conflict, Besley and
Reynal-Querol (2013) trace the current violent outcomes in Africa to violence occur-
ring before the colonial rule. An important source of divisions based on historical
experience is linguistic policy and in particular linguistic disenfranchisement (Gins-
burgh and Weber, 2011; Ginsburgh et al., 2005). Besides the inherited divisions of
the past, the conflict episode’s own history is an important factor in explaining vio-
lent outcomes. Novta (2013) demonstrates how violent conflicts can spread, arguing
that ethnically homogenous localities give rise to violent movements that then spill
over to more ethnically heterogenous neighborhoods.
Our paper contributes to the literature on ethnic divisions and conflict by pro-
viding a within-country analysis of the civil conflict in Sri Lanka. We introduce two
new measures of ethnic divisions instead of relying on the less precise “off-the-shelf”
measures. We account for how ethnic divisions vary spatially and temporally by
linking these divisions to the specific history of Sri Lanka. Since there is a strong
linguistic component associated with the conflict, we pay special attention to his-
torical differences in linguistic disenfranchisement. Our paper also incorporates the
8
conflict episode’s history, allowing violent outcomes in neighboring regions to affect
the measure of ethnic divisions directly.
3. The History of the Civil Conflict in Sri Lanka
The civil conflict took place over the course of three decades. Figure 1 illustrates
the timeline of the number of casualties, while Figure 2 gives the number of victims
by district. The conflict has been separated into four phases by the Sri Lankan
Ministry of Defense, which correspond to periods as a time unit of analysis in our
econometric results. Eelam War I started in 1983 and ended with a peace negotiated
in 1987 with the help of Indian peacekeepers. By 1990, Eelam War II (1990-1995) had
begun due to the conflict escalating again after failed peace negotiations. Between
Eelam War II and Eelam War III (1995-2002), it was not peace that determined
the break but a different course of action by LTTE, which graduated from terrorist
attacks on civilians to large-scale military campaigns against the Sri Lankan Army.
During the third Eelam War, LTTE managed to succeed in making the northern
part of the island a stronghold. However, the tide turned against LTTE in Eelam
War IV (2003-2009) with the diminished international support resulting from the
September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States as many states began
to officially recognize LTTE as a terrorist organization. In addition, the tsunami in
2004 primarily hit the north-eastern part of the island, the areas where LTTE had
the most control. In the aftermath and recovery from the tsunami, the Sri Lankan
army started offensive operations, which ended with the death of Prabhakaran, the
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head of LTTE, in May 2009. Shortly thereafter, the civil conflict concluded.
As one can see by the war period classification, the LTTE played the central
opposition role. Its preferred instrument of attack was political assassination, the
most famous of which was that of Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in
1993. However, the LTTE did not assassinate Sinhalese politicians only; they also
assassinated Tamil politicians who cooperated with the government. In addition, the
LTTE was not the only organization committing violence against the government and
the government attributed some attacks to LTTE without the organization claiming
them. There were also extremist groups among the Sinhalese, for example the Peoples
Liberation Front (JVN), whose alleged attacks killed a large number of people as well
as a number of pogroms, including the one that plunged the conflict into a full-blown
civil war in 1983, which resulted in as many as 2,000 victims and 100,000 refugees
(Laitin, 2000).
As with any prolonged conflict, the complexity of the potential causes and feed-
back mechanisms makes it difficult to give a conclusive treatment. Among the Sin-
halese and Tamils, one can point to causal factors related to differences in race,
religion, region and custom (Geertz, 1963). Here, we focus on linguistic disenfran-
chisement as one potential cause. Laitin (2000) demonstrates that the case of Sri
Lanka had all the ingredients for a language-based violent conflict. In fact, the first
instance of violent civil conflict in the newly independent nation occurred as a direct
result of the passage of the Official Language Act No. 33 in 1956, also known as the
Sinhala-only Act, which explicitly and vociferously instituted a monolingual policy,
and led to linguistic disenfranchisement of Tamil speakers.
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The potential for linguistic-based conflict was rooted in the swabasha movement
during the late colonial period. This movement aimed at preserving and enriching
indigenous languages, especially with respect to English under British rule. Impor-
tantly, the movement consisted of both Sinhalese and Tamils working together to
increase the status of their respective languages. During the transition to indepen-
dence and for various reasons, Sinhalese politicians neglected the Tamil demands for
linguistic equality, culminating in the Sinhala-only Act.
The colonial legacy of British rule contributed to the particular tensions that
emerged form the official resolution of the swabasha movement. During the British
colonization, the minority Tamil population gained a significant economic advantage
over the Sinhalese majority, particularly because of the relatively better English
training in the northern part of the island. De Votta (2004) reports that the Tamil
population held 33% of civil service jobs, 40% of judicial service jobs and 31% of
the students in university, figures that are much greater than their representative
share. In addition, English was the language of the elites, which meant that the
average Tamil likely had better access to clientelistic networks that were in place
under British rule and likely persisted after independence. These networks were
organized along ethnic lines and were far reaching affecting not just the elite but
also peasants (Korf, 2005).3
3One can point to a number of other reasons for why the tensions between the Tamils and the
Sinhalese escalated into a full blown civil war. The first set focuses on several key parliamentary
actions that significantly hindered the Tamil population. These include the Citizenship Act, the
Parliament Act #48, and the Prevention of Terrorism Act. Others point to demographic reasons.
There is a very large Tamil population located on the sub-continent of India. Some argue that this
population caused the Sinhalese to have the desperation of an aﬄicted minority group (Tambiah,
1986). Finally, Kapferer (1988) argues that, while there has been relatively peaceful coexistence
of the two main groups for two millennia, there certainly was a history of violence. The differing
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While the civil conflict clearly contained an ethnolinguistic component, some
scholars believe that it was not causal and merely a representation of a different
sort of underlying conflict. Most notably, Laitin (2000), who even entertains the
possibility that the linguistic differences actually ameliorated the conflict, asks a
provocative question: “Why did the language issue disappear from public debate in
inverse proportion to the level of escalation of violence on the island?” Indeed, Tamil
gained the status of a national language in 1977 before the beginning of the outbreak
of the war.
For Laitin, the driving force of the conflict is best characterized as a “sons-of-
the-soil” conflict, whereby the land colonization in the northern territories by the
Sinhalese that occurred after independence threatened the security of the Tamil way
of life. In addition, Laitin argues that, in practice, English and Tamil were tolerated
since it was bureaucratically impossible to switch over to Sinhala-only in 24 hours
as the proponents of the 1956 Act claimed it could do. In addition, non-Sinhalese
speakers who had been in office during the colonial administration were given a grace
period to switch over before losing their jobs. But these arguments are largely off the
mark if one takes seriously the effects of linguistic disenfranchisement. First, it is not
merely the realized outcomes that matter for tensions but the increased uncertainty
surrounding the relative benefits of language acquisition and the returns to already
acquired linguistic skills. Second, it is not merely theTamil language that suffered
linguistic disenfranchisement but also English, which affected the Tamil population
relatively more than the Sinhalese. Third, linguistic disenfranchisement of English
myths over heroes, the legitimatizing claim of official statements in reinforcing interpretations about
history, and the political support of custom raised the stakes of control over public resources.
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took time to occur and to only slowly weaken and disrupt the clientelistic networks
inherited from the colonial period. One would therefore expect the conflict to take
time to materialize. Finally, it is not difficult to see that symbolic disenfranchisement
may have an impact on tensions even when de facto disenfranchisement is minimal.
At the very least, the 1956 riots, which followed directly from the linguistic disen-
franchisement of the Tamils, became a part of the history of the conflict itself and
contributed to the subjective or psychological costs of heterogeneous population on
the island.
We end this historical section by providing some historical details concerning the
colonial linguistic policy under British rule. The British were initially not interested
in English language training, despite the fact that the English-speaking population
for nearly every ethnic group on the island, including the majority Sinhalese, was
virtually nonexistent.4 The British policy changed dramatically under the leadership
of Colebrooke, a British administrator sent by the imperial government to ascertain
why the colony was losing money, who strongly advocated English training and use.
Colebrooke had been impressed by the effort of American missionaries in teaching
English as opposed to British missionaries who were focused on spreading Christian-
ity in the vernacular.
Notwithstanding the colonial authorities’ efforts, American missionaries spread
English among the youth but Americans were restricted to the northern part of the
island. Their efforts centered around the Vaddukkodai (Batticotta) Seminary on
Jaffna peninsula. The decision to locate in the north was more or less a historical
4The one exception was the Burghers. Burghers did not need English language instruction since
many were using it in trade and connections with Europe.
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accident. American missionaries wanted to go to Calcutta, India, but were not
welcome because of the War of 1812. A member of the group fled India for Sri
Lanka. In Colombo, the governor of Ceylon greeted him in a friendly manner and
encouraged him to set up a mission on the island. The Americans were, in turn,
interested in Sri Lanka because of the Tamil population, which could be used to
reach the many Tamils in South India. The governor and missionaries agreed on the
establishment of a mission in some abandoned churches in the north of the island.
The British authorities then restricted the Americans to the north because of security
concerns, which had been heightened after the War of 1812 (Root, 1916).
After Colebrooke’s influence, the British aimed at English language instruction
all across the island but due to poor instruction the outcome was low literacy with
pockets of literacy centered around areas with good teachers:
In several Anglo-vernacular schools which I have visited, the teacher sup-
posed to teach English has been quite unable to converse with me in
English, and it has been necessary for the inspector who accompanied
me to act as interpreter (Government of Ceylon, 1879, quoted in Copere-
hewa, 2011).
The lack of success led the British to shut down English training in many govern-
ment schools. In 1900, there were four government schools that provided English
instruction compared to 144 missionary-assisted schools.
To sum-up, the English language policy of the British, which was largely unsuc-
cessful, and the efforts of American missionaries, which were successful but limited
in reach, provided important variation in the change in English language proficiency
14
during the colonial rule.
4. Polarization indices
Esteban and Ray (1994) formalized the concept of polarization for societies with
income differences between groups. They derive the form of their polarization index
from a certain numbers of axioms which lead to an index of the form
∑
i 6=j
p1+δi pj|yi − yj|, i, j = 1, 2, . . . n,
where pi and pj are shares of groups i and j in the geographic entity that is analyzed,
yi and yj represent the average incomes of groups i and j, |yi − yj| measures the
distance between the two groups in terms of (average) incomes and δ is a positive
constant.5
Polarization introduces the idea of identification with individuals of one’s own
group, say i and alienation with those of group j 6= i. The insertion of identification-
alienation considerations in the usual form of diversity indices,
∑
i 6=j pipj, i, j =
1, 2, . . . n, affects the functional form of polarization indices in two ways: the ex-
ponent (1 + δ) instead of 1, and distances |yi− yj| between (the average incomes of)
groups. An individual in a specific group feels identified with other individuals of his
group. The degree of identification depends on pi, the size of the group, and is given
by the value pδi , where the positive sign of δ implies that identification is stronger in
5Esteban and Ray (1999) take a more general interpretation of the distances between groups,
using average differences between income levels as a proxy for “differences in preferences over public
goods” between groups.
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larger groups.
The two features, identification with own group and alienation towards others,
create societal antagonism. Given the population shares of two groups pi and pj, the
combined effective antagonism of group i towards group j is equal to pδi × pi × pj or
p1+δi × pj. The societal level of social effective antagonism is the sum of the effective
antagonisms between all pairs of groups. The axioms introduced by Esteban and Ray
allow them to narrow down the range of δ to values between 0 and 0.6, according to
the form of (in their case) the income distribution of individuals.
Reynal-Querol (2002) considered a special case of Esteban and Ray’s index with
δ = 1, the axiomatic support to which was suggested later by Geng (2012):
∑
ij,i6=j
p2i pj =
∑
i
p2i (1− pi).
They focus on what they call relevant groups, thus avoiding the issue of distances
by implicitly using a dichotomous 0-1 distance measure between groups.
4.1. L- and E-indices of polarization
Nothing, however, prevents using the extension of the polarization index to multi-
lingual societies suggested by Desmet et al. (2009). The degree of alienation is then
given by pδi × dij, where dij represents the linguistic distance between groups i and
j, and leads to the following index:
∑
i,j,i6=j
p2i pjdij, (1)
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which reintroduces distances between groups that are present in Esteban and Ray’s
index. However, the distance metric is much more complicated in this case since
linguistic proximity lacks the linear structure of the income differences utilized in
Esteban and Ray’s model.
In the usual context, (1) describes polarization in countries, and there is one such
index per country. Looking at the country-level restricts the analyst to a common
historical process for all countries. The commonly used linguistic or genetic distance
matrices, and even the ad hoc one of zeros and ones, are all the result of long-run
historical processes. Here we deal with one country only, taking into account each
of the 25 Sri-Lankan districts, and can therefore, focus on less distant historical
processes.
As illustrated in figure 2, there exist four linguistic groups (Sinhalese, Tamils,
Moors and Europeans, mainly English-speaking) in various proportions in each dis-
trict, and the index varies across districts since pi and pj vary. In the standard
formulation, linguistic distances would remain the same in all districts. This (lin-
guistic) polarization index will be called L-index. We, in fact, modify the L-index
to the E-index, to reflect in a better way the colonial heritage of Sri Lanka. The
distances utilized in the construction of E-index are derived on the basis of differ-
ences in English linguistic outcomes during the late colonial period in each district.
The independence of the country affected the relative status of English speakers vs.
non-English speakers over a wide range of conflict determinants. Of course, English
language proficiency can directly and indirectly affect violent conflict and these ef-
fects could be entirely independent of linguistic disenfranchisement. To remedy this
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problem, we focus not on levels but on changes in English proficiency under the
colonial rule. In particular, we focus on the generation of people who invested in
learning English during and leading up to the swabasha movement, a push by both
Tamils and Sinhalese for greater official status and preservation of their respective
languages relative to English. In the historical section, we outlined our argument for
why this change in English language proficiency is exogenous.
This generation of English speakers are important for several reasons. First, after
independence, it lost some of the benefits of the investment in English. We would
also expect the children of such individuals to experience this shock to human capital,
driven by linguistic disenfranchisement. Second, the uncertainties surrounding the
official linguistic policy could heighten tensions and concerns about what is at stake
in the political process. Third, the diminished importance of English affected the
stability of clientelistic networks, over which English speakers had a relatively strong
hold during the colonial and transition periods.
E-index distances are constructed as follows for each district: the linguistic dis-
tance between English and each of the four groups (Sinhalese, Tamils, Moors and
Europeans, mainly English-speaking), diE is multiplied by col
k, an index of colonial
heritage measured by the change in district k of English language proficiency be-
tween 1921 and 1946, divided by the 1946 level.6 This distance which varies across
districts, can be written as
dkij = d
k
iE = diE × colk,
6We normalize by the 1946 level in order to better capture the impact of the change relative to
the level effect.
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Then the district k’s E-polarization index is represented as
∑
ij,i6=j
(pki )
2pkjd
k
iE.
Since the 1971 census7 does not contain data on English literacy in order to verify
that changes in English literacy from 1921 to 1946 preserved the disparities instigated
by the colonial legacy. Linguistic distances between the four groups are calculated
using linguistic trees.8
4.2. Dynamic polarization indices
Given that the four consecutive wars extended over 26 years (1983-2009), it may
have changed the level of effective antagonism for each group in each district. It
seems thus appropriate to also use a dynamic version of the polarization index,
assuming that a district’s conflict experience has an effect on each district. The
realization of violent conflict can heighten and possibly distort the perception of
social antagonism. We incorporate this aspect of societal divisions by assuming that
the violence experienced in the districts that border district k directly impact the
perceived effective antagonism of each group in the district. In particular, we assume
that, as the conflict intensifies, the identification with one’s own group and its size
is magnified as well as the perception of each rival group. This magnification occurs
relative to a reference population, which could be the population during peace time
71971 is the last year for which there are census data before the wars started in 1983.
8See Fearon (2003); Ginsburgh and Weber (2011) or the linguistic tree at
http://www.ethnologue.com/family index.asp.
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or any of the previous conflict periods. Following the notation in the static case, we
denote pki,t as the population share of group i in district k in period t.
Let piki,t be the perceived population share of group i in region k at period t (for
t = t0, . . . , tT ). Then, we define the magnification process in the following way:
piki,t = (1− ωkt−1)
t−1∑
j=0
αjf(p
k
i,0, . . . , p
k
i,j, ω
k
0 , . . . , ω
k
j ) + ω
k
t−1
where the αj’s are weights over the possible reference populations, so that all αj
are nonnegative numbers and their sum is equal to 1, ωkt−1 is the ratio of victims in
period t−1 in the districts that border (inclusive) district k with respect to the total
population of the region, andf(·) is always positive and increasing in ω and p.
The central parameter of this index is ω, which approximates the probability that
one could have been killed by an attack as well as gives an indication of the intensity
of the conflict in the previous period. If the number of victims in the previous period,
ωkt−1, is very small, say, close to zero, the degree of antagonism does not raise and
remains almost at the same level as in the previous period. However, if the number
of victims in the previous period is very large, the antagonism rapidly raises and may
even approach the highest level of 1. In general, during the conflict piki,t is increasing
if ωkt−1 is increasing with the rate of increase being determined by the number of
victims in the previous period. In addition, smaller groups are magnified more than
larger groups which, as is well known, will yield higher values of the polarization
index.
There are three special cases that attract special attention.
For αkt−1 = 1, α
k
j = 0 for all j = 0, . . . , t − 2 and f(pki,j, ωkj ) = pki,j, we obtain a
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formulation that exhibits memorylessness where the perceived antagonism is deter-
mined only by the previous period:
piki,t = (1− ωkt−1)pki,t−1 + ωkt−1 = pki,t−1 + (1− pki,t−1)ωkt−1
which can also be written as piki,t = p
k
i,t−1 + (1− pki,t−1)ωkt−1.
For αk0 = 1, α
k
j = 0 for all j = 1, . . . , t − 1, and f(pki,j, ωkj ) = pki,j, we obtain a
formulation that exhibits anamnesis since the population share of the peaceful period
is recollected as the reference population:
piki,t = (1− ωkt−1)pki,0 + ωkt−1
Since ωk0 = 0, pi
k
i,1 is simply, p
k
i,0, the population share of group i in district k in the
last period of peace before the conflict.
For αkt−1 = 1, α
k
j = 0 for all j = 0, . . . , t − 2 and f(pki,j, ωkj ) = (1 − ωkj )piki,j + ωkj ,
we obtain a recursively formulated anamnestic index, which also uses the peaceful
period as the reference population but the transition from one period to the next
shares a similar structure:
piki,t = (1− ωkt−1)piki,t−1 + ωkt−1
Given our data limitations, of these three, we can only construct the anamnestic
indices since we observe population shares only in the last peace period and not in
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each period.9 In the empirical section, we adopt the simple anamnestic index instead
of the recursive one. The reasons for doing so are both empirical and conceptual.
Over time, the recursive anamnestic index loses variation, both across time and dis-
tricts, putting a strain on estimation, especially for low probability events. While the
recursive index is attractive from the point of view that the magnification of popula-
tion contains memory of past conflicts, it is reasonable to approximate the dynamics
of the societal level of perceived social effective antagonism as characterized by an
underlying structural level of antagonism that experiences temporary flare-ups, as
the simple anamnestic index does.
We then plug the piki,t’s into district k’s polarization index to get the societal level
of perceived social effective antagonism in a district, which can be written:
∑
ij
(piki,t)
2pikjtd
k
ij, t = t0, 1, 2, . . . , tT ,
where t0 and tT have to be chosen in an appropriate way. This index is calculated
for both the L- and the E- forms.
5. Data and Methods
We construct district-level measures of conflict intensity, ethnic polarization, urban
share of the population, population growth, and in particular, the change in the
share of the population that is Sinhalese, and English literacy.
9We could approximate these population shares but we would then face bias in the empirical
estimates due to nonclassical measurement error.
22
Number of victims. The main measure of conflict intensity is the number of victims
of the LTTE terrorist attacks, shown in figure 2. While this measure is far from ideal,
it is an adequate one, given the central role that LTTE played in the civil conflict,
and, in some respects, the best available one, given the severe data limitations for
such a data generating process.
The LTTE were involved in 284 terroristic acts, assassinations and military at-
tacks from 1975 to 2009. For each of these acts, we observe the town, district and
province as well as an estimate of the number of casualties, cross-checking when
possible.10 The number of LTTE victims by district and war period can be found
in Table 2. There are a substantial number of district-periods with zero victims and
some districts have no victims during the entire civil war. We have chosen to exclude
the military clashes between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Army. The casualties
from these battles were over a region that separates the main part of the island and
the Jaffna peninsula and took the lives of about six thousand people. This number
makes for about half of the total number of deaths caused by the LTTE attacks. Only
10% of the estimated total number of victims fell to the LTTE attacks, according to
our data. Our number of victims is likely to be a lower bound since some victims
went unreported either because they were missing or unaccounted for or possibly
mislabeled as refugees. However, the results may not fully represent the conflict in
general.
Polarization indices. For ethnic group population shares, we draw on two main
10See the appendix for how these estimates were constructed. The main sources are 1) Sri Lankan
Ministry of Defense, 2) TamilNet, 3) South Asia Terrorist Portal (since 1987), 4) Annual reports
on Sri Lanka by Amnesty International (since 1995) and 5) News sources. (Plotnikov, 2011)
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sources: the Sri Lankan Population Censuses of 1971 and 1981 (Department of Cen-
sus and Statistics, 1974; Natural Resources, Energy and Science Authority, 1998)
and the Ceylon Census of 1946 (Department of Census and Statistics, 1950). The
1971 census was the last all-island demographic survey before the conflict. The fol-
lowing censuses avoided the northern districts because of the war. Between 1946
and 1971 as well as between 1971 and today, the geographical division of the island
changed several times (new districts were carved out of several parts of the island,
again, in the north, where the war was most severe and the data on LTTE activity
is abundant). In order to maximize data points, we either take a simple average of
the old districts that make-up the new districts or if a new district is fully contained
in an old one we use the old district numbers. This procedure may bias the results
since districts were not randomly formed.
Other data. The socioeconomic controls that we use are the following: share of
urban population in 1971 (Department of Census and Statistics, 1974), population
growth from 1946-1981 and English language proficiency (Department of Census and
Statistics, 1950).11 The Natural Resources, Energy and Science Authority (1998) is
an additional source of data on population growth.
We first relate the the total number of victims per 100,000 population on the
spatial variation in polarization over the 25 districts, assuming that the shares of the
four groups in every district in 1971 are exogenous to the conflict.12
11Additional variables exist if we were to use the United Nations Development Program’s Human
Development Reports on Sri Lanka, the first of which was published in 1998 and has the 1994
estimates of a poverty index, GDP per capita and other economic data. However, the Northern
Province and for some other districts data are missing since these reports were conducted during
the civil war.
12The exogeneity of the change in English proficiency during the colonial period has been discussed
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By using the total number of victims over the whole war period (25 observations,
we estimate the following usual static equation:
yi = α + γPi + βXi + i
In this equation, y is the number of victims per 100,000 population in each district
(the number of heads are for 1981 as this is the last year with population data by
district before the conflict started and the only measure of population available until
much later in the conflict); P is a static measure of polarization (either L-index or E-
index); X stands for a set of controls that includes the urban share of the population
in each district, the population growth between 1946 and 1981, and period or year
fixed effects;  is a random disturbance term. It is well-known that if Pi suffers from
measurement error and this error is uncorrelated with the true value of polarization,
then the imprecision will result in reducing the estimate of γ. Thus, we would expect
L- polarization to produce estimated effects closer to zero than E- polarization under
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation.
Before moving on to the dynamic measure of polarization, it is worth discussing
an additional estimation issue, one that has not been adequately addressed in the
conflict literature. Suppose we want to estimate the following regression:
yit = αt + γPit + βXit + it
but the actual measure of polarization employed is Qi, where Pit ≡ Qi + uit; uit is
in Section 3.
25
unobservable to the econometrician and E[uit|Qi] = 0. That is, if we could observe
P , then Q would be orthogonal to the error term and we could then sign the bias
coming from the measurement error. If Q and u are correlated, then OLS will
produce biased estimates of γ and the sign of the bias is in general unknown. It
is not hard to see how this assumption could be violated. In particular, a common
approach in this literature is to include a lagged dependent variable since there is
often a concern about serial dependence in conflict data. In this case, we rewrite the
equation above as yit = α + ρyit−1 + γQi + βXit + (γuit + it). Here, we need the
assumption that E[uit|yit−1] = 0, which is obviously violated if these changes are the
result of a magnification of effective antagonism as described in the discussion of our
dynamic measure. We note that, since the econometrician observes Pit, using our
dynamic polarization measure avoids this issue, and we can account for time-varying
changes in effective antagonism by estimating
yit = αt + γPit + βXit + it
where t
(i) either distinguishes the pre-war and the four war-periods, with period fixed effects
(125 observations, that is 5 periods × 25 observations)
(ii) or separates the data into 35 years with year fixed effects (875 observations , that
is 35 years × 25 observations).
We can also allow for serial dependence by including the lagged dependent vari-
able as well as time-invariant factors by including district-level dummy variables. In
the latter case, the identification of the effect of polarization is coming directly from
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the time varying component. Notice that the above argument does not in any way
consider the presence of unobservable time invariant factors. Since the commonly
used polarization measures do not change over time, fixed effects estimation has
been avoided. Under the usual OLS assumptions, the inclusion of this lagged depen-
dent variable has been seen as harmless, apart from its role as a potentially omitted
variable. Allowing for serial dependence by including the lagged dependent variable
is problematic when including fixed effects, especially since the lagged dependent
variable is likely correlated with u and hence P . To remedy this, we also estimate
using Arellano and Bond’s method for dynamic specifications for period and yearly
data, corresponding to (i) and (ii) above. We treat the polarization measure as an
endogenous variable and restrict our instruments to be in levels and the number of
lags to two. We present the fixed effects estimation for completeness, although the
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable should not be interpreted.
We perform several alternative specifications. First, we discuss threats to iden-
tification by addressing the concern that the association between the E-index and
conflict intensity is not due to a linguistic source of the conflict but rather reflects
the correlation between E- distances and some other causal mechanism. The most
likely candidate is the favored explanation of the conflict by Laitin (2000), the land
colonization of the Sinhalese in the north. Since we do not have a direct measure
of land colonization, we use two different measures. First, we simply use a proxy
for land colonization as a control variable. The land colonization proxy that we use
is the change in the population share of the Sinhalese in a district from 1946-1971.
The land colonization explanation argues that the Sinhalese moved into areas where
27
they had not previously had a presence and acquired land for settlement. Ideally, we
would have liked to take data from the beginning of independence to the beginning
of the civil war but this measure is the closest we can get. Second, we create a sim-
ilar polarization measure as the E-index but, instead of using the colonial linguistic
policy as a basis for distances, we use a measure of divisions that is based on land
colonization post-independence. We refer to this new index as LC-polarization and it
is constructed as the E-index but with dki equal to change in the population share of
the Sinhalese in a district from 1946-1971. Additionally, to alleviate concerns about
the correlation between English proficiency and unobservables such as remittances
(which could have affected the attack technology) or persistent underdevelopment of
the labor market (which could have been correlated with the demand for English),
we control directly for English language proficiency in 1971. Second, since some dis-
tricts never experienced LTTE attacks, we rerun our results excluding such districts.
Third, we accommodate the underlying count data aspect of the dependent variable
by transforming the number of victims per 100,000 population to the number of at-
tacks in a period or year, and estimate the equation using the zero-inflated Poisson
model.
6. Results
All our tables present the results for L- and E-indices measures of polarization de-
scribed in Section 4. We also control for the urban share of population and for
population growth between 1946 and 1981; these controls disappear if district fixed
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effects are added and when Arellano and Bond’s method is used, since they are
constant over time.
Table 3 presents the results of the regression on cross-section data only, aggre-
gating all 35 years of war and peace. The first two columns give the specification
without any additional controls, while columns (3) and (4) add the two main controls,
urbanization in 1971 and pre-conflict population growth. The L-index is positively
related to conflict but is statistically different from zero only when control variables
are omitted, while the E-index is significant in both specifications. The economic
impact of the effect is significant. One standard deviation in polarization in each dis-
trict yields as many as 9,459 more LTTE victims on the island (which is large given
that LTTE victims only accounted for 10% of the civil conflict’s victims). Since we
run these regressions on relatively few data points, we include the added variable
plot for L- and E-polarization in Figures 4 and 5 to see whether outliers are driving
the result and verify that most of the plotted points fall near the regression line.
The plot for E-polarization, shown in Figure 5, shows that most values fall along the
regression line, which is reassuring. One can also see that the plot for L-polarization,
shown in Figure 4, fits the data less well. The difference between these two measures
suggests that it is important to incorporate country-specific determinants of ethnic
divisions.
Tables 4 and 5 contain the results of dynamic models over the four war periods
plus the pre-war period (125 observations) and over yearly data (875 observations).
In both cases, we make use of dynamic indices. Columns (1) to (4) contain OLS re-
sults with period or year effects and with and without the lagged dependent variable;
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in columns (5) and (6) we add district fixed effects, and columns (7) and (8) go to
Arellano and Bond estimation. Though both the L- and the E- dynamic polarization
indices enter with a positive sign throughout, only the second one is significantly dif-
ferent from zero at the 1% probability level for the specifications without fixed effects
for both the period and yearly data.13. For the yearly results in Table 5, the E-index
always outperforms the L-index. The positive sign of the coefficients picked up by
the lagged dependent variable, under both OLS and Arellano-Bond specifications,
seems to imply that conflict begets conflict. The coefficient should not be interpreted
for the OLS with fixed effects since the point estimates are biased.
The results in Tables 6 and 7 explore alternative explanations that may be cor-
related with the polarization measures. In Table 6, we present the results of both
including a proxy for land colonization as a control variable in columns (1) to (4)
and using LC-polarization (which uses land colonization as a source of divisions in
a similar way as E-polarization) in columns (5) to (7). The inclusion of the land
colonization variable does not alter the results in a significant way but the coefficient
is positive, suggesting that there is some merit to this explanation. However, the
tensions that land colonization caused do not appear to fall along ethnolinguistic
lines as the polarization measure with land colonization distances does not produce
statistically significant effects. In Table 7, we add the English proficiency control
in place of district fixed effects. As discussed, English may have been correlated
with unobservables that affected the number of victims but were unrelated to ethnic
divisions. The previous results remain robust to its inclusion.
13With the exception of columns (5) and (7) in Table 4 where the coefficient is also significantly
different from zero
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The results in Tables 8-10 are devoted to robustness checks. Table 8 explores the
effects of changing the definition of the dependent variable from number of victims
per 100,000 heads to an alternative formulation which is the maximum number of
victims in a given year during the war period, since the average number of victims
in a war period may be sensitive to the number of years in a period. In Table 9,
we compute similar regressions excluding districts with a low number of victims.
Finally, since the dependent variable can be considered as count data, in Table 10,
we also present the results of zero-inflated Poisson estimation in which the dependent
variable is the number of attacks during the war or per period of war. The marginal
effects are large and mostly statistically significant. The use of attacks instead of
victims lessens the concerns that attack technology is driving the results. In the
zero-inflated Poisson model we can not account for the serial dependence in the data
so the estimates using the dynamic measure should be taken with a grain of salt.
7. Conclusion
We use the tragic events of the civil conflict in Sri Lanka to illustrate the importance
of history in determining the degree of divisions in a society. We introduce two mea-
sures of polarization. The first accounts for the differential impacts of the island’s
colonial legacy, while the second explicitly addresses the sensitivity of divisions to
the specific history of the conflict. The quantitative evidence in this paper suggests
that the intensity of the conflict is significantly related to our measures of ethnolin-
guistic polarization. The economic significance of the marginal effects is large, a one
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standard deviation in E-index in each district would predict a near doubling of the
victims of LTTE attacks during this three decade long conflict.
If colonial heritage has an influence on the extent of ethnic divisions, it is only
natural to investigate how polarization measures might be impacted by colonial poli-
cies in other contexts. Work by Nunn and Wantchekon (2011) already shows that
differences in the historical exposure to the slave trade generated persistent differ-
ences in the level of mistrust in African countries. The authors are also able to
disentangle the effect of historical violence on institutional quality from the effect
on inherited norms. Incorporating the effect of historical violence on group divisions
and estimating the corresponding effects on institutional quality and public order
would give policymakers a better understanding of the nature of potential conflicts
in these areas with a history of violence.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable No. of obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent variables
LTTE victims per 100,000 capita 875 0.002 0.009
LTTE victims per 100,000 capita 125 0.012 0.03
LTTE victims per 100,000 capita 25 62.08 93.77
Number of LTTE-related attacks 875 0.3234 0.0071
Number of LTTE-related attacks 125 2.264 4.6631
Number of LTTE-related attacks 25 11.24 16.4476
Polarization measures
Dynamic E-index 875 0.0438 0.0323
Dynamic L-index 875 0.1339 0.0664
Dynamic E-index 125 0.0438 0.0325
Dynamic L-index 125 0.1340 0.0667
E-index 25 0.0429 0.0315
L-index 25 0.1043 0.632
Other variables
% English speakers in 1946 25 0.051 0.035
∆ English from 1921-46 25 0.023 0.018
Urban share of population in 1971 25 0.19 0.146
Population growth from 1946-81 25 0.028 0.012
Population in 1971 25 505680 390792
Population in 1981 25 593870 416535
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Table 2: The number of LTTE victims by district and war period
District War Period
Pre-Civil War Eelam War I Eelam War II Eelam War III Eelam War IV
1978-1982 1983-1987 1988-1994 1994-2001 2002-2009
Period 0 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Period 4
Ampara 0 97 452 94 29
Anuradhapura 0 202 148 12 100*
Badulla 0 0 0 0 0
Batticaloa 0 161 343 59* 14
Colombo 1 221 96 465 185
Galle 0 0 0 0 0
Gampaha 0 0 0 2 15
Hambantota 0 0 0 0 0
Jaffna 18 63 18* 162* 16*
Kalutara 0 0 6 0 0
Kandy 0 0 0 18 2
Kegalle 0 0 0 0 0
Kilinochchi 0 0 0* 0* 0
Kurunegala 0 0 0 0 0
Mannar 3 6 0 0 8
Matale 0 9 0 0 123
Matara 0 0 0 0 14
Moneragala 0 0 53 0 36
Mullaitivu 0 73 19 10* 45
NuwaraEliya 0 0 0 0 0
Polonnaruwa 0 64 387 0 33
Puttalam 0 0 40 14 0
Ratnapura 0 0 0 0 0
Trincomalee 0 509 201 136 40*
Vavuniya 0 87 53 21 37
Notes: An asterisk (*) denotes that this period contains victims from military clashes,
which have been removed from the reported amount.
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Table 3. Effects of polarization on victims per district
Pooling all periods, OLS estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L-polarization 680.83∗∗ - 366.28 -
(275.05) (257.58)
E-polarization - 2002.61∗∗∗ - 1330.59∗∗
(458.06) (514.03)
Urban share of population - - 167.34 112.44
(101.36) (94.93)
Population growth, 1946-81 - - 3782.49∗∗∗ 2789.64∗∗
(1307.48) (1280.37)
Intercept -8.92 -23.76 -112.35∗∗ -93.34∗∗
(33.35) (24.21) (42.51) (37.34)
No. of observations 25 25 25 25
R2 0.210 0.454 0.480 0.568
Adjusted R2 0.176 0.430 0.406 0.506
Dependent variable is LTTE victims per 100,000 population.
Standard errors between brackets; ∗ p <0.10; ∗∗ p <0.05; ∗∗∗ p <0.01.
See text for the definitions of L- and E-polarization.
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Table 4. Effects of polarization on victims per war period and district
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
L-dynamic polarization 0.059 0.066 24.691* 0.457***
(0.038) (0.046) (14.618) (0.174)
E-dynamic polarization 0.262*** 0.311*** 14.025 0.629***
(0.086) (0.109) (33.555) (0.182)
Urban share of population 0.035** 0.022 0.039* 0.026
(0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.020)
Population growth, 1946-81 0.813*** 0.548** 0.923*** 0.660**
(0.205) (0.225) (0.266) (0.279)
Lagged dependent variable 0.106 0.048 -0.545*** -0.388** 0.121 0.018
(0.104) (0.103) (0.163) (0.162) (0.103) (0.094)
Intercept -0.030*** -0.023*** -0.034*** -0.028*** -3.296* -0.602 -0.053** -0.018**
(0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (1.958) (1.469) (0.024) (0.009)
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes No No
No. of observations 125 125 100 100 100 100 100 100
R2 0.265 0.304 0.287 0.331 0.237 0.207
Adjusted R2 0.221 0.263 0.233 0.280 -0.080 -0.121
Dependent variable is LTTE victims per 100,000 population.
Columns (1)-(2) OLS); columns (3)-(6) OLS with victims lagged; columns (7)-(8) Arellano-Bond estimation.
Standard errors between brackets; ∗ p <0.10; ∗∗ p <0.05; ∗∗∗ p <0.01.
See text for the definitions of L- and E-polarization.
Arellano-Bond estimation restricted to two lags.
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Table 5. Effects of polarization on victims per year and district
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
L-dynamic polarization 0.008* 0.007 17.219*** 0.013
(0.005) (0.005) (4.767) (0.015)
E-dynamic polarization 0.037*** 0.030*** 46.738*** 0.081***
(0.011) (0.011) (10.749) (0.022)
Urban share of population 0.005** 0.003 0.004* 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Population growth, 1946-81 0.116*** 0.079*** 0.090*** 0.060**
(0.025) (0.028) (0.025) (0.028)
Lagged dependent variable 0.256*** 0.249*** 0.139*** 0.126*** 0.242*** 0.213***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.041) (0.041) (0.028) (0.028)
Intercept -0.005*** -0.004** -0.003 -0.002 -2.303*** -2.043*** -0.000 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.638) (0.470) (0.003) (0.002)
Period fixed effects No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes No No
Number of observations 875 875 850 850 850 850 850 850
R2 0.112 0.122 0.168 0.174 0.131 0.138
Adjusted R2 0.073 0.083 0.130 0.136 0.066 0.073
Dependent variable is LTTE victims per 100,000 population.
Columns (1)-(2) OLS); columns (3)-(6) OLS with victims lagged; columns (7)-(8) Arellano-Bond estimation.
Standard errors between brackets; ∗ p <0.10; ∗∗ p <0.05; ∗∗∗ p <0.01.
See text for the definitions of L- and E-polarization.
Arellano-Bond estimation restricted to two lags.
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Table 6. Effects of land colonization and polarization on victims per district
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
L-polarization 376.868
(259.990)
E-polarization 1411.042**
(513.651)
L-dynamic polarization 0.058
(0.038)
E-dynamic polarization 0.278***
(0.087)
LC-polarization 33.070
(106.675)
LC-dynamic polarization 0.006 0.006 -0.008
(0.015) (0.018) (0.031)
Urban share of population 191.276* 140.522 0.039** 0.027 171.037 0.034** 0.038*
(106.326) (96.972) (0.017) (0.017) (106.124) (0.017) (0.021)
Population growth, 1946-81 3604.657** 2478.457* 0.787*** 0.484** 4394.141*** 0.877*** 0.979***
(1336.041) (1295.107) (0.208) (0.229) (1357.207) (0.216) (0.280)
landcol 138.689 182.131 0.024 0.037
(170.274) (153.675) (0.028) (0.027)
Lagged dependent variable 0.127 0.268**
(0.104) (0.108)
Intercept -121.212** -104.197** -0.031*** -0.026*** -93.305** -0.024*** -0.026** 0.007
(44.214) (38.098) (0.009) (0.008) (43.684) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006)
Period fixed effects No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes No No
No. of observations 25 25 125 125 25 125 100 100
R2 0.497 0.596 0.270 0.315 0.433 0.251 0.272
Adjusted R2 0.396 0.515 0.219 0.268 0.352 0.206 0.217
Dependent variable is LTTE victims per 100,000 population.
Columns (1)-(4) uses land colonization as a control; Columns (5)-(8) uses land colonization as distances.
Columns (1),(2) and (5) pooling all periods; columns (3), (4), (6)-(8) per war period.
Columns (1)-(6) OLS estimation; column (7) OLS with lagged dependent variable; column (8) Arellano-Bond estimation.
Standard errors between brackets; ∗ p <0.10; ∗∗ p <0.05; ∗∗∗ p <0.01. See text for the definitions of L-, E- and LC-polarization.
Arellano-Bond estimation restricted to two lags.
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Table 7. Effects of polarization on victims per district (incl. English proficiency)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L-polarization 330.986
(267.078)
E-polarization 1288.495**
(550.395)
L-dynamic polarization 0.051 0.007
(0.039) (0.005)
E-dynamic polarization 0.255*** 0.036***
(0.091) (0.011)
Urban share of population -7.632 47.319 0.001 0.010 0.000 0.001
(292.847) (269.562) (0.048) (0.046) (0.006) (0.006)
Population growth, 1946-81 4297.822** 3013.887* 0.910*** 0.587** 0.130*** 0.084**
(1552.854) (1570.159) (0.244) (0.271) (0.030) (0.034)
English proficiency 802.949 306.780 0.154 0.053 0.022 0.008
(1258.320) (1184.602) (0.207) (0.204) (0.025) (0.025)
Period fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects No No No No No No
Number of observations 25 25 125 125 875 875
R2 0.490 0.569 0.268 0.305 0.113 0.122
Adjusted R2 0.389 0.483 0.218 0.257 0.073 0.082
Dependent variable is LTTE victims per 100,000 population.
Columns (1)-(2) pooling all periods; columns (3)-(4) per war period; columns (5)-(6) per year, OLS estimation.
Standard errors between brackets; ∗ p <0.10; ∗∗ p <0.05; ∗∗∗ p <0.01. See text for the definitions of L- and
E-polarization.
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Table 8. Effects of polarization on alternative measure of victims per war period
and district
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
L-dynamic polarization 0.036 0.042 13.597 0.270**
(0.025) (0.031) (10.662) (0.108)
E-dynamic polarization 0.165*** 0.202*** -7.318 0.373***
(0.058) (0.073) (23.291) (0.119)
Urban share of population 0.019* 0.011 0.023 0.014
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Population growth, 1946-81 0.501*** 0.332** 0.594*** 0.413**
(0.137) (0.150) (0.177) (0.188)
Lagged dependent variable 0.060 0.009 -0.525*** -0.308* 0.078 -0.006
(0.107) (0.105) (0.176) (0.167) (0.100) (0.094)
Intercept -0.018*** -0.014*** -0.019** -0.016** -1.812 0.329 -0.029* -0.008
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (1.428) (1.020) (0.015) (0.006)
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District fixed effects No No No No Yes Yes No No
No. of observations 125 125 100 100 100 100 100 100
R2 0.238 0.275 0.246 0.291 0.220 0.203
Adjusted R2 0.192 0.232 0.188 0.237 -0.103 -0.127
Dependent variable is victims per war period per 100,000 population, defined as the largest no. of
victims in a year within a period.
Columns (1)-(2) OLS; columns (3)-(6) OLS with victims lagged;
columns (7)-(8) Arellano-Bond estimation. Standard errors between brackets; ∗ p <0.10; ∗∗ p <0.05;
∗∗∗ p <0.01.
See text for the definitions of L-and E-polarization.
Arellano-Bond estimation restricted to two lags.
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Table 9. Effects of polarization: Excluding districts with low level of victims
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
L-dynamic polarization 0.096 0.111 24.078 0.456**
(0.059) (0.074) (17.855) (0.197)
E-dynamic polarization 0.285** 0.344** 7.753 0.632***
(0.109) (0.139) (40.514) (0.230)
Urban share of population 0.022 0.011 0.025 0.013
(0.022) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027)
Population growth, 1946-81 0.691** 0.480* 0.802** 0.587*
(0.262) (0.276) (0.336) (0.344)
Lagged dependent variable 0.083 0.031 -0.546*** -0.378* 0.063 -0.003
(0.125) (0.124) (0.194) (0.192) (0.122) (0.112)
Intercept -0.028** -0.020* -0.033** -0.025* -3.274 -0.370 -0.050* -0.018
(0.013) (0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (2.440) (2.017) (0.028) (0.013)
Period Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
District Effects No No No No Yes Yes No No
No. of observations 90 90 90 90 72 72 72 72
R2 0.275 0.310 0.272 0.312 0.271 0.244
Adjusted R2 0.214 0.251 0.192 0.237 -0.057 -0.095
Dependent variable is LTTE victims per 100,000 population.
Columns (1)-(2) OLS); columns (3)-(6) OLS with victims lagged; columns (7)-(8) Arellano-Bond estimation.
Standard errors between brackets; ∗ p <0.10; ∗∗ p <0.05; ∗∗∗ p <0.01.
See text for the definitions of L-and E-polarization.
Arellano-Bond estimation restricted to two lags.
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Table 10. Effects of polarization on the number of attacks in a district for all periods and
per war period
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L-polarization 43.125*** - - -
(6.175) - - -
E-polarization - 62.809*** - -
- (9.120) - -
L-dynamic polarization - - 3.475** -
- - (1.777) -
E-dynamic polarization - - - 3.039
- - - (2.455)
Urban share of population 100.765*** 97.685*** 5.012*** 5.049***
(13.244) (12.840) (0.848) (0.858)
Population growth, 1946-81 517.841*** 575.31*** 32.695*** 35.703***
(78.973) (85.255) (9.177) (9.106)
Period Effects No No Yes Yes
District Effects No No No No
No. of observations 25 25 125 125
Log-likelihood -607.152 -612.426 -249.169 -250.531
Dependent variable is the number of LTTE-related attacks.
Columns (1)-(2) all periods; columns (3)-(4) war periods.
Zero-inflated Poisson estimation.
Standard errors between brackets; ∗ p <0.10; ∗∗ p <0.05; ∗∗∗ p <0.01.
See text for the definitions of L- and E-polarization.
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Figure 1: Timeline of LTTE Victims
Source: Plotnikov (2011)
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Figure 2: Map of LTTE Victims 
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Source: Plotnikov (2011)
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Figure 3: Spatial Distribution of Ethnic Groups
    
Sinhalese Sri-Lankan Tamil Indian Tamil Moors 
Map 2. Shares of ethnic groups in population of districts, % (2001 data, 1981 in italics)36 
 
                                                 
36 The images taken from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Sri_Lanka , data verified 
Source: Plotnikov (2011)
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Figure 4: Added Variable Plot of L-polarization
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Figure 5: Added Variable Plot of E-polarization
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Appendix
This data used to construct the dependent variable was collected by Plotnikov (2011).
He lists his sources as follows:
1. Descriptions of LTTE atrocities by years, posted at the website of Sri Lankan
Ministry of Defense. However, the list is not complete.14
2. News site of TamilNet, internet portal featuring Tamil view on current affairs.
The news are provided in numerous articles dating back to June, 199715
3. Independent track of the conflict up to current moment made by South Asia
Terrorist Portal. At the website of SATP the list of suicidal terrorist attacks
attributed to LTTE since 1987 has been published, along with lists of other
attacks which were carried by the organization (assassinations and military
attacks).16
4. Annual reports on Sri Lanka published by Amnesty International, in which the
LTTE attacks have been also described, since 1995.17
5. While the above mentioned sources were the main ones in the survey, the list
of LTTE attacks, compiled at Wikipedia, was used as a source of links to the
articles by various news agencies, such as Reuters or BBC, devoted to particular
accidents.18
14http://defence.lk/LTTE/LTTE.asp
15http://www.tamilnet.com/cat.html?catid=13
16http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/shrilanka/database/index.html
17http://www.amnestyusa.org/all-countries/sri-lanka/page.do?id=1011241
18http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of attacks attributed to the LTTE
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